Decorrelation over Infinite Domains: the Encrypted CBC-MAC Case by Vaudenay, S.
Decorrelation over Innite Domains:
the Encrypted CBC-MAC Case
Serge Vaudenay
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL)
Serge.Vaudenay@epfl.ch
Abstract Decorrelation theory has recently been proposed in order to address the security of block
ciphers and other cryptographic primitives over a nite domain. We show here how to extend it to
innite domains, which can be used in the Message Authentication Code (MAC) case.
In 1994, Bellare, Kilian and Rogaway proved that CBC-MAC is secure when the input length is xed.
This has been extended by Petrank and Racko in 1997 with a variable length.
In this paper, we prove a result similar to Petrank and Racko's one by using decorrelation theory.
This leads to a slightly improved result and a more compact proof.
This result means to be a general proving technique for security, which can be compared to the approach
which was announced by Maurer at CRYPTO'99.
Decorrelation theory has recently been introduced. (See references [17] to [22].) Its rst
aim was to address provable security in the area of block ciphers in order to prove their secu-
rity against dierential [7] and linear cryptanalysis [10]. As a matter of fact, these techniques
have also been used in order to prove Luby-Racko [9]-like pseudorandomness results in a
way similar to Patarin's \coeÆcient H method" [14,15]. All previous cases however address
random functions over a nite domain, which is not appropriate for MACs.
The CBC-MAC construction is well known in order to make Message Authentication
Codes from a block cipher in Cipher Block Chaining mode. Namely, if C is a permutation
dened on a block space f0; 1g
m
, for a message x = (m
1
; : : : ; m
`
) 2 (f0; 1g
m
)
`
we dene
MAC(x) = C(C(: : : C(m
1
) +m
2
: : :) +m
`
):
In 1994, Bellare, Kilian and Rogaway proved that if C is a uniformly distributed random
permutation, then for any integer ` and any distinguisher between MAC and a truly random
function which is limited to d queries, the advantage is less than 3d
2
`
2
2
 m
[6]. This shows
that no adaptive attack can forge a new valid (x;MAC(x)) pair with a relevant probability
unless the total number of known blocks d` is within the order of 2
m
2
. This however holds
when all messages have the xed length `. If the attacker is allowed to use messages with
dierent length, it is easy to notice that for any message m and any block a the MAC of x
concatenated with a MAC(x) is
MAC(x; a MAC(x)) = C(a)
which does not depend on x and allows to forge a new authenticated message by replacement
of x.
In 1997, Petrank and Racko addressed the case of DMAC dened by
MAC(x) = C
2
(C
1
(C
1
(: : : C
1
(m
1
) +m
2
: : :) +m
`
))
(see [16]). This type of construction does not mean any originality since it is already suggested
by several standards [2,3,4]. Its security was however formally proved in [16] for the rst time.
If we replace C
2
by C
2
Æ C
 1
1
we can obviously remove the last C
1
application. We can
thus consider the MAC dened by
MAC(x) = C
2
(C
1
(: : : C
1
(m
1
) +m
2
: : :) +m
`
)
which we call the \encrypted CBC-MAC" in the sequel. In this paper we give a security
proof which is dierent from [16] and with a slightly improved reduction. Our proof also
happens to be more compact (it is less than 2-page long), thanks to use of the decorrelation
theory tools. Our approach is also more general and can be applied to other schemes. In this
way it can be compared to the information theoretic general approach which was announced
by Maurer at CRYPTO'99 [12].
1 Prerequisite
1.1 Denitions and Notations
First of all, for any random function F from a set M
1
to a set M
2
and any integer d we
associate the \d-wise distribution matrix" which is denoted [F ]
d
, dened in the matrix set
R
M
d
1
M
d
2
by
[F ]
d
(x
1
;:::;x
d
);(y
1
;:::;y
d
)
= Pr[F (x
1
) = y
1
; : : : ; F (x
d
) = y
d
]:
Given a metric structure D in R
M
d
1
M
d
2
we can dene the distance between the matrices
associated to two random functions F and G. This is the \d-wise decorrelation distance".
If G is a random function uniformly distributed in the set of all functions from M
1
to M
2
(we let F

denote such a function), this distance is called the \d-wise decorrelation bias
of function F" and denoted DecF
d
D
(F ). When F is a permutation (which will usually be
denoted C as for \Cipher") and G is a uniformly distributed permutation (denoted C

) it is
called the \d-wise decorrelation bias of permutation F" and denoted DecP
d
D
(F ). In previous
results we used the metric structures dened by the norms denoted jj:jj
2
(see [18]), jjj:jjj
1
,
jj:jj
a
, jj:jj
s
(see [21]). These four norms are matrix norms, which means that they are norms
on R
M
d
1
M
d
2
with the property that
jjA Bjj  jjAjj:jjBjj:
This property leads to non-trivial inequalities which can shorten many treatments on the
security of conventional cryptography.
Given two random functions F and G from M
1
to M
2
we call \distinguisher between
F and G" any oracle Turing machine A
O
which can send M
1
-element queries to the oracle
O and receive M
2
-element responses, and which nally outputs 0 or 1. In particular the
Turing machine can be probabilistic. In the following, the number of queries to the oracle
will be limited to d. The distributions on F and G induces a distribution on A
F
and A
G
,
thus we can compute the probability that these probabilistic Turing machines output 1. The
advantage for distinguishing F from G is
Adv
A
(F;G) = Pr
h
A
F
! 1
i
  Pr
h
A
G
! 1
i
:
2
For any class of distinguishers Cl we will denote
Adv
Cl
(F;G) = max
A2Cl
Adv
A
(F;G):
We notice that if A is a distinguisher, we can always dene a complementary distinguisher

A = 1 A which gives the opposite output. There is no need for investigating the minimum
advantage when the class is closed under the complement (which is the case of the above
class) since
Adv

A
(F;G) =  Adv
A
(F;G):
We consider the class Cl
d
a
of all (adaptive) distinguishers limited to d queries.
1.2 Properties
The d-wise distribution matrices have the property that if F and G are independent random
functions, F fromM
2
to M
3
and G fromM
1
to M
2
, then
[F ÆG]
d
= [G]
d
 [F ]
d
:
Thus, if we are using a matrix norm jj:jj, we obtain
DecF
d
jj:jj
(F ÆG)  DecF
d
jj:jj
(F ):DecF
d
jj:jj
(G):
and the same for permutations.
The jj:jj
a
norm dened in [21] has the quite interesting property that it characterizes the
best advantage of a distinguisher in Cl
d
a
.
Lemma 1 ([21]). For any random functions F and G we have
jj[F ]
d
  [G]
d
jj
a
= 2:Adv
Cl
d
a
(F;G):
In this paper, we will use the jj:jj
a
norm only and omit it in the notations.
Finally we recall the following lemma.
Lemma 2 ([21]). Let d be an integer, F
1
; : : : ; F
r
be r random function oracles, and C
1
; : : : ; C
s
be s random permutation oracles. We let 
 be a deterministic oracle Turing machine which
can access to the previous oracles and an input tape x. It denes a random function G(x) =

(F
1
; : : : ; F
r
; C
1
; : : : ; C
s
)(x). We assume that 
 is such that the number of queries to F
i
is limited to some integer a
i
, and the number of queries to C
j
is limited to b
j
in total for
any i = 1; : : : ; r and any j = 1; : : : ; s. We let the F

i
(resp. C

j
) be independent uniformly
distributed random functions (resp. permutations) on the same range than F
i
(resp. C
j
) and
we let G

= 
(F

1
; : : : ; F

r
; C

1
; : : : ; C

s
). We have
DecF
d
(G) 
r
X
i=1
DecF
a
i
d
(F
i
) +
s
X
j=1
DecP
b
j
d
(C
j
) + DecF
d
(G

):
This lemma actually separates the problem of studying the decorrelation bias of a construc-
tion scheme into the problem of studying the decorrelation biases of its internal functions F
i
and C
j
and studying the decorrelation bias of an idealized version G

.
3
1.3 The CoeÆcient H Method
Patarin introduced the \coeÆcient H method" which enables to make pseudorandomness
proofs more systematic. In the decorrelation theory setting, this method can be formalized
by the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let d be an integer. Let F be a random function from a set M
1
to a set M
2
.
We let X be the subset of M
d
1
of all (x
1
; : : : ; x
d
) with pairwise dierent entries. We let F

be a uniformly distributed random function from M
1
to M
2
. We assume there exist a subset
Y  M
d
2
and two positive numbers 
1
and 
2
such that
{ jYj(#M
2
)
 d
 1  
1
{ 8x 2 X 8y 2 Y [F ]
d
x;y
 (1  
2
)(#M
2
)
 d
.
Then we have DecF
d
(F )  2
1
+ 2
2
.
This lemma intuitively means that if [F ]
d
x;y
is close to [F

]
d
x;y
for all x and almost all y,
then the decorrelation bias of F is small. Although this lemma is quite straightforward with
techniques inspired by Patarin [14,15] and Maurer [11], it is formally proved in [22].
As an illustration, Lemma 3 can be used in order to prove the famous Luby-Racko
Theorem easily as shown in Appendix.
Theorem 4 (Luby-Racko 1986 [9]). Let F

1
; F

2
; F

3
be three independent random func-
tions on f0; 1g
m
2
with uniform distribution. We have
DecF
d
(	(F

1
; F

2
; F

3
)) 2d
2
:2
 
m
2
DecP
d
(	(F

1
; F

2
; F

3
)) 2d
2
:2
 
m
2
:
The results hold for Feistel schemes dened from any (quasi)group operation.
1
2 Decorrelation Biases of Functions over an Innite Domain
In order to dene decorrelation biases of MACs, we need to address the problem of having
innite sets. Let for instance F be a random function dened from M

1
to M
2
(M

1
is
the set of all nite sequences with entries inM
1
). We dene the [F ]
q
1
;:::;q
d
matrix with rows
dened onM
q
1
1
: : :M
q
d
1
and columns dened onM
d
2
. Next we dene DecF
q
1
;:::;q
d
(F ) as the
distance between [F ]
q
1
;:::;q
d
and [F

]
q
1
;:::;q
d
, where F

has a uniform distribution. Additionally,
we can dene
DecF
d;q
(F ) = max
q
1
+:::+q
d
=q
DecF
q
1
;:::;q
d
(F ):
We can easily check that all previous results remain valid for these denitions, namely:
{ The best advantage of a distinguisher limited to d (adaptively) chosen queries with a
total length of q blocks between F and F

is
1
2
DecF
d;q
(F ).
1
Here 	(F

1
; F

2
; F

3
) is the standard notation for a Feistel cipher with three rounds and round functions F

1
; F

2
; F

3
.
4
{ As in Lemma 2, if G = 
(F
1
; : : : ; F
r
; F
0
1
; : : : ; F
0
s
) uses functions F
i
and F
0
j
on xed input
length, but with occurrence numbers of a
i
` and b
j
respectively where ` is the length of
the input of G, we have
DecF
d;q
(G) 
r
X
i=1
DecF
a
i
q
(F
i
) +
s
X
j=1
DecF
b
j
d
(F
0
j
) + DecF
d;q
(G

):
We can use permutations C
i
and C
0
j
as well and have DecP instead of DecF, or even
mixtures of functions and permutations.
{ Lemma 3 still holds with DecF
d;q
instead of DecF
d
and X equal to the set of (x
1
; : : : ; x
d
)
with total length q.
3 Security of MAC
Message Authentication Codes (MAC) are functions which map any binary string onto a
xed length value
2
with a secret key. In this paper, we consider functions dened on the
set (f0; 1g
m
)

of nite sequences of m-bit integers.
3
For instance, given a block cipher Enc
K
which is a permutation on f0; 1g
m
dened from a secret key K, we consider the CBC-MAC
construction dened by
MAC
K
(m
1
; : : : ; m
`
) = Enc
K
(Enc
K
(: : :Enc
K
(m
1
) +m
2
: : :) +m
`
):
Since the secret key K is unknown by the opponent and chosen at random by the legitimate
user, we can consider equivalently C = Enc
K
as a random permutation with a given publicly
known distribution, and the MAC itself as a random function.
The purpose of MACs is to authenticate messages. Namely, the legitimate authenticator
provides MAC(x) is order to authenticate a message x. Saying that a MAC is (d; q; p)-secure
means that for any opponent who can use the legitimate authenticator as an oracle for at
most d  1 chosen messages x
1
; : : : ; x
d 1
and issue an (x
d
; c) pair such that x
d
6= x
i
for any i
and that the total length of x
1
; : : : ; x
d
is of q m-bit blocks, the probability that c = MAC(x
d
)
is less than p. This is the security against adaptive existential forgery attacks.
We notice that if MAC is such that DecF
d;q
(MAC) = , then it is a (d; q; 2
 m
+

2
)-secure
MAC. Namely, for any opponent we can make a distinguisher who just query the forged
x
d
and check whether the output is c or not. Since the advantage must be less than

2
, the
probability of success of the opponent must be less than

2
plus the probability of success
against a truly random function, which is 2
 m
. Hence we use DecF
d;q
(MAC) upper bounds
as security evidences.
For instance, we can consider the Bellare-Kilian-Rogaway result which works with a xed
input length `.
2
More precisely, the MAC is the output of the function, but will improperly call the function a MAC.
3
Note that arbitrary bit strings do not always have an integral number of blocks. For this we must use a padding
scheme like the Merkle-Damgard [8,13] one in order to transform an arbitrary string into a string with an integral
number of blocks. In this paper we prove the security for padded messages which induces the security for the whole
scheme with the padding scheme.
5
Theorem 5 (Bellare-Kilian-Rogaway 1994 [6]). For any xed integer `, we consider
the function MAC dened on ` m-bit blocks from a uniformly distributed random function
F

as follows.
MAC(m
1
; : : : ; m
`
) = F

(F

(: : : F

(m
1
) +m
2
: : :) +m
`
):
For any d we have DecF
d
(MAC)  6d
2
`
2
2
 m
. The result holds for any (quasi)group addition.
Here is another result which is quite similar to the An-Bellare result [5].
Theorem 6 ([22]). Let F
1
and F
2
be two independent random functions from f0; 1g
b+m
to
f0; 1g
b
. For any ` and any (m
1
; : : : ; m
`
) 2 (f0; 1g
m
)
`
we dene
MAC(m
1
; : : : ; m
`
) = F
2
(F
1
(: : : F
1
(F
1
(0; m
1
); m
2
) : : : ; m
`
); `)
where 0 means a b-bit zero string, and ` means an m-bit string which represents the ` value.
Considering distinguishers limited to d queries and a total length of qm bits we have
DecF
d;q
 DecF
q
(F
1
) + DecF
d
(F
2
) + q(q   1)2
 m
:
Finally, here is the Petrank-Racko [16] result.
Theorem 7 (Petrank-Racko [16]). Let C
1
and C
2
be two independent random permuta-
tions on f0; 1g
m
with the same distribution C. For any ` and any (m
1
; : : : ; m
`
) 2 (f0; 1g
m
)
`
we dene
MAC(m
1
; : : : ; m
`
) = C
2
(C
1
(C
1
(: : : C
1
(C
1
(m
1
) +m
2
) : : :+m
` 1
) +m
`
)):
Considering adaptive distinguishers limited to d queries and a total length of qm bits we have
DecF
d;q
(MAC)  2DecP
q
(C) + 4q
2
2
 m
:
The result holds for any (quasi)group addition.
4 Encrypted CBC-MAC
Here is our main result.
Theorem 8. Let C
1
and C
2
be two independent random permutations on f0; 1g
m
. For any
` and any (m
1
; : : : ; m
`
) 2 (f0; 1g
m
)
`
we dene
MAC(m
1
; : : : ; m
`
) = C
2
(C
1
(: : : C
1
(C
1
(m
1
) +m
2
) : : :+m
` 1
) +m
`
):
Considering adaptive distinguishers limited to d queries and a total length of qm bits we have
DecF
d;q
(MAC) DecP
q d
(C
1
) + DecP
d
(C
2
)
+d(d  1)2
 m
+ q(q + 1)(1 + q2
 m
)2
 m
:
The result holds for any (quasi)group addition.
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This result is slightly better than Theorem 7.
Proof. Lemma 2 reduces to the case where C
1
and C
2
are independent uniformly distributed
random permutations.
Using Lemma 3, let Y be the set of all y = (y
1
; : : : ; y
d
) with dierent y
i
s. We thus have

1
= 1 
2
md
2
m
(2
m
  1) : : : (2
m
  d+ 1)

d(d  1)
2
2
 m
:
Now for any collection of x
i
= (m
i;1
; : : : ; m
i;q
i
) we let
U
i;j
= C
1
(: : : C
1
(C
1
(m
i;1
) +m
i;2
) : : :+m
i;j 1
) +m
j
:
We consider the event E that all U
i;q
i
are pairwise dierent. We have
[MAC]
q
1
;:::;q
d
x;y
 Pr[MAC(x
i
) = y
i
; i = 1; : : : ; d and E]
= Pr[MAC(x
i
) = y
i
; i = 1; : : : ; d=E] Pr[E]
=
1
2
m
(2
m
  1) : : : (2
m
  d+ 1)
Pr[E]
 2
 md
(1  Pr[

E])
therefore we can take 
2
= Pr[

E] = Pr[9i < r;U
i;q
i
= U
r;q
r
].
The remaining part of the proof consists of upper bounding 
2
by
q(q+1)
2
(1 + q2
 m
)2
 m
and applying Lemma 3.
We call a collision an event U
i;j
= U
r;s
. This collision is trivial if (m
i;1
; : : : ; m
i;j
) =
(m
r;1
; : : : ; m
r;s
) and non-trivial otherwise. Let Inv be the event that C
1
(U
i;j
) = 0 for some
i; j, and let Coll be the event that we have a non-trivial collision. We can easily show that the

E event is included in Inv[Coll: if U
i;q
i
= U
r;q
r
, then eitherm
i;q
i
6= m
r;q
r
and it is a non-trivial
collision, or it reduces to U
i;q
i
 1
= U
r;q
r
 1
and we can iterate... Thus 
2
 Pr[Inv] + Pr[Coll].
The probability that any adaptive attack against C
1
nds a preimage of 0 after q   d
queries is obviously less than
q
2
m
 q
. Thus Pr[Inv] 
q
2
m
 q
.
We let U be the set of all U
i;j
-indices, which means the set of all (i; j) such that 1  i  d
and 1  j  q
i
. For A  U we let c(A) be
c(A) = f(i; j); 9(r; s) 2 A i = r and j  sg:
Thus c(A) is the set the indices of all U
i;j
which are required in order to compute all U
r;s
values for (r; s) 2 A. We dene an ordering on 2
U
by
A  B () c(A)  c(B):
We let I be the set of all indices pairs of potential non-trivial collisions U
i;j
= U
r;s
, namely
the set of all pairs f(i; j); (r; s)g of U -elements such that (m
i;1
; : : : ; m
i;j
) 6= (m
r;1
; : : : ; m
r;s
).
For f(i; j); (r; s)g 2 I we let Coll
i;j;r;s
be the event of the collision U
i;j
= U
r;s
(which is nec-
essarily non-trivial since f(i; j); (r; s)g 2 I), and we let MinColl
i;j;r;s
be the complementary
7
in Coll
i;j;r;s
of the union of all Coll
i
0
;j
0
;r
0
;s
0
for f(i
0
; j
0
); (r
0
; s
0
)g 2 I and f(i
0
; j
0
); (r
0
; s
0
)g <
f(i; j); (r; s)g. We easily notice that
Coll =
[
f(i;j);(r;s)g2I
MinColl
i;j;r;s
:
We have at most
q(q 1)
2
terms in I. Hence
Pr[Coll] 
q(q   1)
2
max
f(i;j);(r;s)g2I
Pr[MinColl
i;j;r;s
]:
For f(i; j); (r; s)g 2 I, let us consider the MinColl
i;j;r;s
event. We assume without loss of
generality that s  j. Since we have no previous collision we must have m
i;j
6= m
r;s
. Further-
more we must have U
i;j 1
6= U
r;s 1
because C
1
is a permutation (otherwise C
1
(U
i;j 1
) +m
i;j
cannot be equal to C
1
(U
r;s 1
) +m
r;s
) and j > 1, and we need to consider the event
C
1
(U
i;j 1
) +m
i;j
= U
r;s
:
If we have a collision U
i;j 1
= U
i
0
;j
0
with (i; j 1) 6= (i
0
; j
0
) and (i
0
; j
0
) 2 c(i; j; r; s), it must be
trivial (otherwise the initial collision is not minimal) which means j
0
= j   1 and i
0
= r 6= i
and (m
i;1
; : : : ; m
i;j 1
) = (m
r;1
; : : : ; m
r;j 1
). If s < j we have U
i;j
= U
r;s
and U
r;s
= U
i;s
thus
U
i;j
= U
i;s
which is non-trivial, which contradicts the minimality of the initial collision. Thus
we must have s = j, but the trivial collision U
i;j 1
= U
r;j 1
then contradicts U
i;j 1
6= U
r;s 1
.
Therefore U
i;j 1
is equal to no U
i
0
;j
0
for (i
0
; j
0
) 2 c(i; j; r; s)\f(i; j   1)g. This implies that
the marginal distribution of C
1
(U
i;j 1
) with the knowledge of all previous U
i
0
;j
0
is uniform
among a set of at least 2
m
  q + 1 elements. Hence Pr[MinColl
i;j;r;s
] 
1
2
m
 q
.
Finally we obtain

2

q
2
m
  q
+
q(q   1)
2

1
2
m
  q

q(q + 1)
2
(1 + q2
 m
)2
 m
:
Applying Lemma 3 now completes the proof. ut
5 Extensions
In our result we notice that since d  q, the bound is small until q reaches the order
of 2
m
2
. This result is tight since usual collision attacks can break our construction within
this complexity. Actually, we can query 2
m
2
two-block messages until we get a collision
MAC(m
1
; m
2
) = MAC(m
0
1
; m
0
2
) then query c = MAC(m
1
; m
2
; m
3
) and output a forged au-
thenticated message ((m
0
1
; m
0
2
; m
3
); c). We have d = 2
m
2
+2 and q = 2:2
m
2
+6 and p  1 e
 1
.
We may think that since we have an m-bit MAC and a security of 2
m
2
uses we have an
eÆciency loss in term of storage. We can improve this construction by shrinking the MAC
on
m
2
bits as suggested in most of standards. More precisely, let F be a random function
from f0; 1g
m
to f0; 1g
b
. We can dene
MAC(m
1
; : : : ; m
`
) = F (C(: : : C(C(m
1
) +m
2
) : : :+m
` 1
) +m
`
)
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and we have
DecF
d;q
(MAC)  DecP
q
(C) + DecF
d
(F ) + q(q + 1)(1 + q2
 m
)2
 m
:
(In the proof, we take Y equal to the full set so that 
1
= 0.)
If we now want to shorten the two keys, we can replace the independent C and F random
functions by dependent ones. Let jj[C; F ]
q
  [C

; F

]
q
jj
a
denote the decorrelation distance
between the (x; y) 7! (C(x); F (y)) and the (x; y) 7! (C

(x); F

(y)) functions where C

and
F

are two independent uniformly distributed permutation and function. This is half of the
best advantage for distinguishing them from q queries. It already includes DecP
q
(C) and
DecF
d
(F ). So, even if C and F are dependent, we still have
DecF
d;q
(MAC)  jj[C; F ]
q
  [C

; F

]
q
jj
a
+ q(q + 1)(1 + q2
 m
)2
 m
:
As an example we can use C = DES
K
and F = Trunc ÆDES
K+c
for a given constant c,
and where Trunc truncates a 64-bit string onto its rst half and DES is the Data Encryption
Standard [1]. We get a MAC on b = 32 bits with a single 56-bit key and block of m = 64
bits. We obtain
DecF
d;q
(MAC)  jj[C; F ]
q
  [C

; F

]
q
jj
a
+ q(q + 1)(1 + q2
 64
)2
 64
:
So, let f() be the sum of the best advantages for distinguishing
{ DES from C

{ Trunc ÆDES from F

{ (DES
K
;Trunc ÆDES
K+c
) from (DES
K
1
;Trunc ÆDES
K
2
)
within a total number of query blocks less than q = 2
32
(which is a limit of 32GB of
queries). The advantage of any distinguisher is less than
f()+
2
2
thus the probability of success
of any adaptive existential forgery attack is less than 2
 32
+
f()+
2
2
. Let us conjecture that
f

1
10

 2
 7
. If we authenticate less than 3GB, the probability of success of the best attack
is less than 1%.
The Advanced Encryption Standard will soon provide better security with m = 128.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that the regular CBC-MAC construction provides a secure MAC when the
output is encrypted. The security analysis suggests that if m is the block length of the
underlying block cipher, then we should not use the MAC construction on more than 2
m
2
blocks in total.
In order to t to the security, we can even reduce the MAC length down to
m
2
bits, and
shorten the key with extra security hypothesis. This enables to prove the security of existing
standards.
These results are quite similar than the Petrank-Racko ones. Our technique based on
decorrelation theory is however quite systematic and can be applied to most of current MAC
constructions with compact proofs.
Finally, we believe that these techniques will contribute to making systematic proof
analysis of cryptographic schemes and ultimately lead to some automatic security validation
procedures.
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A Proof of Theorem 4
Following the Feistel scheme F = 	(F

1
; F

2
; F

3
), we let
x
i
= (z
0
i
; z
1
i
)
10
z2
i
= z
0
i
+ F

1
(z
1
i
)
y
i
= (z
4
i
; z
3
i
)
We let E be the event z
3
i
= z
1
i
+ F

2
(z
2
i
) and z
4
i
= z
2
i
+ F

3
(z
3
i
) for i = 1; : : : ; d. We thus have
[F ]
d
x;y
= Pr[E]. We now dene
Y =
n
(y
1
; : : : ; y
d
); 8i < j z
3
i
6= z
3
j
o
:
We can easily check that Y fulll the requirements of Lemma 3. Firstly we have
jYj 
 
1 
d(d  1)
2
2
 
m
2
!
2
md
thus we let 
1
=
d(d 1)
2
2
 
m
2
. Second, for y 2 Y and any x (with pairwise dierent entries),
we need to consider [F ]
d
x;y
. Let E
2
be the event that all z
2
i
s are pairwise dierent over the
distribution of F

1
. We have
[F ]
d
x;y
 Pr[E=E
2
] Pr[E
2
]:
For computing Pr[E=E
2
] we know that z
3
i
s are pairwise dierent, as for the z
2
i
s. Hence
Pr[E=E
2
] = 2
 md
. It is then straightforward that Pr[E
2
]  1  
d(d 1)
2
2
 
m
2
which is 1  

2
. We thus obtain from Lemma 3 that DecF
d
(F )  2d(d   1)2
 
m
2
. From Lemma 3 it is
straightforward that DecF
d
(C

)  d(d   1)2
 m
. We thus obtain DecP
d
(F )  2d
2
2
 
m
2
for
d  2
1+
m
2
. Since DecF is always less than 2, it also holds for larger d. ut
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